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PERVERSE INNOVATION†
DAN L. BURK*
ABSTRACT
An inescapable feature of regulation is the existence of loopholes:
activities that formally comply with the text of regulation, but which
in practice avoid the desired outcome of the regulation. Considerable
ingenuity may be devoted to exploiting regulatory loopholes. Where
technological regulation is at issue, such ingenuity may often be de-
voted to developing new technology that avoids the regulation; such
innovation may be termed “perverse” because it is directed to avoid-
ing the regulation that prompted it. Nonetheless, in this Article I
argue that such regulatory circumvention may result in socially bene-
ficial innovation. Drawing on insights from innovation policy in the
law of intellectual property, I suggest several principles that should
be adopted to channel such perverse innovation toward constructive
activity.
† Copyright 2014-15 by Dan L. Burk.
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. I thank Orly Lobel,
Charles Sabel, and the participants of the Yale Information Society Project’s conference,
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INTRODUCTION
Recombinant crops are unpopular in Europe.1 Known as “GMO,”
an acronym for genetically modified organisms,2 crops that have
been altered by recombinant DNA technologies have sparked public
concern over potential safety and health risks.3 While there is little
scientific evidence to support such concerns,4 the possibility of un-
known risks from such plants prompts European consumers to avoid
foods derived from GMO crops, and both GMO plants and their
products are subject to strict and costly regulatory controls.5
Prominent labeling is required for GMO-derived products, and regu-
latory oversight for GMO planting is stringent.6 Only a handful of
European Union applications for planting GMO crops have ever
been approved, and these have generally not found a market.7
As a consequence, seed producers have moved away from
recombinant DNA technology for producing new seed varieties in
Europe.8 Instead, they have adopted a different approach, producing
new crops with desired characteristics—such as herbicide toler-
ance—through mutagenic chemical or radiation treatments.9
Mutagenic plant varieties may be produced by exposing seeds to
1. See Charles W. Schmidt, Genetically Modified Foods: Breeding Uncertainty, 113
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 526, 528 (2005) (“As far as opinions in Europe go, the public is heavily
against GM.” (quoting Geoffrey Lean, Env’t Editor, INDEP. ON SUNDAY)).
2. See GMO, MERRIAM -WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/GMO
[https://perma.cc/W5WK-KZ3N].
3. See Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Biotechnology Policy: Between National
Fears and Global Disciplines, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 329, 330 (Helen
Wallace et al. eds., 5th ed. 2005).
4. See Alessandro Nicolia et al., An Overview of the Last 10 Years of Genetically Engi-
neered Crop Safety Research, 34 CRITICAL REVS. BIOTECHNOLOGY 77, 77 (2014).
5. See John Davison, GM Plants: Science, Politics and EC Regulations, 178 PLANT SCI.
94, 98 (2010).
6. See id. at 95; Yves Tiberghien, Competitive Governance and the Quest for Legitimacy
in the EU: The Battle over the Regulation of GMOs Since the Mid-1990s, 31 J. EUR. INTE-
GRATION 389, 390 (2009).
7. See Tiberghien, supra note 6, at 390.
8. See Jack Kaskey, Mutant Crops Drive BASF Sales Where Monsanto Denied: Com-
modities, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2013, 11:04 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/
2013-11-13/mutant-crops-drive-basf-sales-where-monsanto-denied-commodities
[https://perma.cc/57JJ-BHD7].
9. See id.
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nuclear radiation, which causes random changes in the plant ge-
nome.10 Alternatively, seeds may be exposed to mutagenic chemi-
cals, again causing random changes in their genes, some of which
may be commercially beneficial.11 Mutated plants with desirable
traits are then selected from the altered seeds and propagated for
sale.12
These mutagenic crops are subjected to essentially no regulation
and, unlike recombinantly modified crops, can be readily grown and
distributed in the European Union.13 For example, the German
chemical firm BASF has successfully produced and marketed
herbicide resistant crop varieties through chemical mutagenesis,
while the “Roundup Ready” herbicide resistant crops produced by
Monsanto via recombinant DNA technology have been restricted.14
There is no indication that mutagenic crops are any safer or health-
ier than GMO crops—indeed, unlike GMO crops, some mutagenic
crops have had to be withdrawn from the market because of inad-
vertently increased levels of naturally occurring toxins, such as
cyanide.15 
There is little question that mutagenic crops have been “geneti-
cally modified” in any common or ordinary sense of that term. To
the degree that uncertainty about possible harms is an issue, one
might actually expect mutagenic crops to be a greater concern, as
mutagenesis introduces multiple random and unpredictable changes
into a plant’s genetic structure, rather than the targeted, controlled
changes introduced by recombinant DNA techniques.16 However,
because they were not modified via recombinant DNA technology,
mutagenic crops do not meet the formal requirements for strict
oversight under the European Union regulatory scheme and so
escape the restrictions imposed on GMO plants.17
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See Shane H. Morris, EU Biotech Crop Regulations and Environmental Risk: A Case
of the Emperor’s New Clothes?, 25 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 2, 2 (2007).
14. See Kaskey, supra note 8.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Jack Kaskey, The Scariest Veggies of Them All, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 22, 2013, 5:52
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-21/monsanto-vs-dot-mutant-crop-
developers-in-global-seed-market [https://perma.cc/S7Y6-KM2T].
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The European shift toward mutagenic crops offers an example of
what I dub “perverse innovation”: perverse not (necessarily) in the
prurient sense, but rather in the sense of being contrary to what
might otherwise be expected or desired. The innovation that has
gone into exploiting a formal loophole in GMO regulation is in at
least two senses perverse. First, it seems perverse in outcome; seed
companies avoid GMO regulation by producing seeds that ironically
may be a greater risk to public health than the products they
replace. But second, from a purely legal standpoint, mutagenic crops
provide a technical work-around to ingeniously dodge the intended
outcome of regulation, while still formally adhering to the text of
the regulation. 
The deployment of mutagenic crops in the European Union thus
provides a striking example of activity that produces unexpected
and unintended technical innovation in response to state regulation.
In a highly regulated and technologically complex world, examples
of this effect occur with increasing frequency. Actors that are subject
to regulation often look for loopholes or work-arounds to avoid
complying with the regulation without formally violating the regu-
lation.18 Where the regulation is technically oriented, such loopholes
or work-arounds may take the form of technical redesign of the
regulated item. Often such technical innovation is orthogonal, and
sometimes even directly contrary, to the intent that was manifest
in the precipitating regulation. 
To the extent that such perverse innovation frustrates the
purpose of regulation—perhaps negating the expected benefit of the
animating regulation, perhaps even creating new risks that were
unanticipated by the regulation—the exploitation of such loopholes
may seem socially counterproductive.19 But, at the same time, tech-
nical innovation is frequently considered to be a social benefit, and
entire bodies of law and policy are devoted to promoting in-
novation.20 Some perverse innovation is likely socially wasteful, but
some may prove to be unexpectedly beneficial. Rather than try to
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 310-17 (2013) (identifying multiple regulatory regimes that
promote innovation).
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close the formalist loopholes that prompt perverse innovation, which
would likely become an ongoing exercise in futility, regulators
might intentionally design loopholes so as to purposefully, rather
than haphazardly, promote innovative responses. 
Recent scholarship has identified a range of underutilized policy
options that might promote innovation.21 In this Article I will sim-
ilarly argue that one adjunct to intellectual property and other legal
innovation incentives may be explicit recognition of, and purposeful
reaction to, the perverse innovative outcomes that occur in response
to imposition of state regulation. I begin by offering several exam-
ples of perverse innovation arising from different regulatory loop-
holes.22 I then explore whether such responses to state regulation
may not only be anticipated, but potentially harnessed as a source
of innovation.23 I ask in particular whether the design of the patent
system, which not only anticipates but encourages similar responses
to patents, can point the way toward regulatory design that might
winnow instances of socially beneficial innovation from instances of
socially wasteful innovation.24
I. EXPLORING LOOPHOLES
Perverse innovation is to some degree a subspecies of a broader
phenomenon, which is the exploitation of “loopholes” in regulatory
imperatives. The exploitation of legal loopholes is a familiar oc-
currence and by no means limited to the provision of seed varieties
in Europe.25 It happens routinely, in all areas of social activity,
producing unexpected and often undesired outcomes as regulation
21. See id.; Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 976 (2012).
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See, e.g., Small Business Contracts: How Oversight Failures and Regulatory Loopholes
Allow Large Businesses to Get and Keep Small Business Contracts: Hearing Before the Ad Hoc
Subcomm. on Contracting Oversight of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 112th Cong. 1-5 (2011) (addressing exploitation of loopholes in government contract-
ing); Elizabeth A. Weeks, The Ethical Health Lawyer: Loopholes: Opportunity, Responsibility,
or Liability?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 321 (2007) (discussing the ethics of exploiting
loopholes in the context of health care law); Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Note, Loophole.com: How
the FEC’s Failure to Fully Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1708 (2009) (examining loopholes in Internet regulation).
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changes behavior in unanticipated ways. Considerable energy and
ingenuity may go into identifying and exploiting loopholes or
alternatives. The outcome is often counterproductive and may or
may not be innovative. 
For example, in the United States, Chrysler Corporation’s popu-
lar “PT Cruiser” automobile was lauded for its innovative, retro
styling, reminiscent of 1930s automotive silhouettes.26 But in a
different sense, perhaps the most significant aspect of the PT
Cruiser design was instead its “footprint,” a regulatory metric
derived from a calculation incorporating the vehicle’s wheel-
base—the distance between the centers of its front and rear
wheels—and its track width—the distance between the wheels on
each side of the vehicle.27 This measurement is used by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency in classifying vehicles for
regulation.28 The PT Cruiser’s footprint places it in the EPA’s
Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) classification for “light
trucks” rather than “passenger cars.”29 This definitional loophole
allowed Chrysler to follow a less stringent fuel efficiency require-
ment than would have been required for a passenger car, allowing
the manufacturer to avoid some of the costs associated with building
a more fuel efficient vehicle.30
Such loopholes in the law are as a general matter unavoid-
able—the inevitable result of various combinations of incomplete-
ness, formalism, and textual ambiguity. When textual terms are
subjected to formal interpretation, the limits articulated in the text
will always include certain activities and exclude other activities.
Those who are subjected to the regulation are thus in a position to
search for excluded, unregulated activities that are formally
26. See, e.g., Tony Swan, 2001 Chrysler PT Cruiser: Road Test, CAR & DRIVER (June 2000),
http://www.caranddriver.com/reviews/2001-chrysler-pt-cruiser-road-test [https://perma.cc/
VJ9A-URB6].
27. See Vehicle Classification Definitions, 49 C.F.R. § 523.2 (2015).
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-420-F-12-051, EPA AND NHTSA SET STANDARDS TO
REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES AND IMPROVE FUEL ECONOMY FOR MODEL YEARS 2017-2025 CARS
AND LIGHT TRUCKS 3 (2012) (noting that “standards are based on CO2 emissions-footprint
curves”).
29. See Derek Kreindler, How CAFE Killed Compact Trucks and Station Wagons, TRUTH
ABOUT CARS (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2012/10/how-cafe-killed-
compact-trucks-and-station-wagons/ [https://perma.cc/EYR8-H4DQ]; Swan, supra note 26.
30. See Kreindler, supra note 29.
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permissible. Some of these will inevitably have been unforeseen
when the text was drafted, as legal texts are well understood to be
incomplete.31 No drafter can foresee all possible contingencies, es-
pecially where innovation is concerned, and it is not only futile, but
expensive to try to incorporate every possible factual scenario into
the ambit of a regulatory text.32 Consequently, some situations will
certainly arise that lie outside the contemplation of any given regu-
lation: some could have been foreseen but mistakenly were not,
some were entirely unforeseeable given the finite information
available to the drafter, and some were simply not foreseen because
the costs of developing information and contingencies for them were
prohibitive.33
This means that doctrinal “loopholes” are to some extent the
converse of what I have explored in previous work as “policy lev-
ers.”34 In some instances, regulatory texts can be written sufficiently
openly or flexibly so as to facilitate their application to unexpected
new factual situations, particularly unexpected new technologies.35
Because some future situations cannot be predicted with any
certainty, the legislature can empower courts or other legal authori-
ties to apply a flexible text as needed to achieve the desired out-
come. In work with Mark Lemley, I have argued that such policy
levers are critical to the innovation incentives of the patent system;
because technology is dynamic, the proper scope and frequency of
patent rewards cannot be predicted.36 Open texts allow the patent
incentive to be calibrated on an ongoing basis.
In the case of loopholes, the opposite occurs: the regulated entity
takes advantage of ambiguities or open language in the text in order
to modulate its activity into formal compliance with the textual re-
quirements. Indeed, in some situations, much as a legislature will
use open text to empower future application of policy levers, regula-
31. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1988) (discussing the textual limitations of contracts).
32. See id. at 756.
33. See id. at 775-76.
34. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 109 (2009); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1575, 1579 (2003).
35. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 34, at 109.
36. See id. at 104-05.
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tors may purposely calibrate regulatory texts so as to prompt inno-
vative private work-arounds.37 This tactic might be used to prompt
any number of socially desired behaviors, but here I am concerned
with situations in which the state purposefully imposes restrictive
regulation specifically in order to prompt product innovation.38 
For example, a combination of penalties and disincentives in U.S.
federal law served to effectively curtail manufacture and sale of in-
candescent light bulbs, forcing development of compact fluorescent,
LED, and halogen alternatives.39 Similarly, the CAFE standards,
mentioned above in conjunction with the PT Cruiser, were expected
to produce some fuel efficiencies through innovation by forcing
manufacturers to develop better fuel consumption technologies.40
Technical redesign in response to such regulation may be a form of
regulatory compliance, anticipated by the regulatory structure.
However, perverse innovation stems largely from the unanticipated
use of loopholes, as in the case of the PT Cruiser, or from the use of
unanticipated loopholes, as in the case of mutagenic European
Union crops. Loopholes in the regulation of European GMOs and
American fuel efficiency produced behavior that is formally
compliant with the text of the regulation, but which may defeat, or
at least avoid, the regulatory purpose. Regulators can of course
37. See id. at 109.
38. I note that, in a similar vein, a number of scholars have begun to recognize that open
or flexible contract language often allows the parties to better perform under conditions of un-
certainty. See Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 297, 297 (2014); Michal Shur-Ofry & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Constructive Ambiguity: IP Licenses
as a Case Study, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 391, 391 (2015).
39. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 321, 121
Stat. 1492, 1573 (2007). Other nations have adopted similar regulations. See Manuel Frondel
& Steffen Lohmann, The European Commission’s Light Bulb Decree: Another Costly
Regulation?, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 3177, 3177 (2011).
40. This could happen through two interrelated effects: the standards could change the
direction of fuel efficiency technology or could change the rate of adoption of fuel efficiency
technology. While there is consistent evidence of the former effect, evidence of the latter effect
is mixed. Compare Don MacKenzie, Mass. Inst. of Tech., Do Automotive Fuel Economy Stan-
dards Increase Rates of Technology Change?, Presented at 31st USAEE/IAEE North Ameri-
can Conference 1 (Oct. 2012), http://faculty.washington.edu/dwhm/files/MacKenzie%20CAFE
%20Standards%20and%20Technology%20Change.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9VC-NCTE] (finding
no evidence that CAFE standards changed the rate of technology adoption), with Thomas
Klier & Joshua Linn, The Effect of Vehicle Fuel Economy Standards on Technology Adoption
2 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 13-40-REV2, 2015), http://www.rff.org/ files/
document/file/RFF-DP-13-40-REV2.pdf [https://perma.cc/386U-K2X5] (finding that CAFE
standards affected both the direction and adoption rate of fuel efficiency technologies).
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amend the text to cover these after-arising situations, but the
amendment process will typically be costly and will only be under-
taken periodically.41 Alternatively, the policy lever approach can be
used to combat contrary loopholes; a court or administrative agency
can be given interpretive authority to try to close loopholes ex post.
Of course, either amending or interpreting the text to cover prev-
iously uncontemplated behaviors may lead to a sort of extended cat-
and-mouse game in which the regulator is continually trying to
catch up with the latest evasion devised to get around the text. As
a practical matter, the game of loophole exploitation and loophole
mending for any given regulation may be unending.
A. Loophole Incentives
Since loopholes are unavoidable and often unforeseeable, the
question I pursue here is whether otherwise perverse loophole
exploitation can be channeled into activity that will tend to be
productive rather than detrimental.42 This requires some thinking
about the incentives that prompt behaviors that take advantage of
loopholes, and how such incentives might be modified. Timothy Wu
has pointed out in a different context that responses to regulation
can be thought of as an exercise in least cost avoidance.43 Regulated
entities will assess the costs of different responses to regulation.44
An entity subjected to regulation might comply with the expected
requirements of the regulation as formally stated in the text of the
regulation. In the majority of regulatory situations, this type of
compliance is the expected behavioral change envisioned by the
regulator. But it will occur only if it is the least costly option.45
41. See Daniel Carpenter, Changing the Conversation About Regulation, WASH. MONTHLY
(Mar./Apr./May 2016), http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/maraprmay-2016/chang
ing-the-conversation-about-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/L7V2-ZFQZ] (noting that regulations
are seen as a necessary evil and outdated but that few changes are made).
42. See infra Part III.
43. See Timothy Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 682 (2003). Wu’s analysis
is a variant on the classic economic “least cost avoider” argument for placing legal liability on
the actor able to avoid social costs at the overall lowest social cost. See Guido Calabresi &
John T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972);
Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J.L. STUD. 13, 28 (1972).
44. See Wu, supra note 43, at 684.
45. See id. at 688.
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As an alternative, the regulated entity may instead choose to
disobey the regulation and accept whatever penalty accompanies
noncompliance. Typically, regulations will entail penalties thought
to be sufficient to prompt compliance, but in individual circum-
stances accepting the penalty may be cheaper than compliance,
particularly if the penalty cost is discounted by the probability of
discovery and enforcement.46 There is also a third possibility, which
is that the regulated entity could attempt to avoid both compliance
and penalty by changing the regulation—perhaps by means of a
court challenge, or perhaps by means of lobbying the relevant agen-
cy or the legislature. Public choice theory teaches us that entities
subject to regulation will choose to comply, to disobey, or to invest
in lobbying depending on which option is the cheapest.47
In addition to the latter two strategies—either to evade the regu-
lation via noncompliance or to avoid the regulation via legislative
lobbying—Professor Leo Katz points out that regulated entities may
pursue a fourth option, which he dubs “avoision,” a portmanteau
word combining evasion and avoidance.48 Avoision constitutes a type
of formal compliance, or at least an ostensible change in behavior,
but is not necessarily the type of compliance the regulator might
have anticipated. In other words, avoision constitutes exploiting a
loophole.49 In this instance, the subject of regulation looks for cheap-
er compliant alternatives to the anticipated requirements of the
regulation. As Wu points out, when the regulatory text allows such
cheaper alternatives, and they are cheaper than the first three re-
sponses, then avoision rather than the expected regulatory behavior
will result.50 
This least cost avoidance model is helpful in understanding the
occurrence of perverse innovation. To understand the implications
of the model, a good starting place is the type of deliberately re-
strictive regulation mentioned above, which employs penalties to
create incentives to innovate.51 In such instances, innovation to
46. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 277-78 (8th ed. 2011).
47. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 9-11 (2d ed. 1971).
48. See LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZ-
ZLES OF THE LAW 4 (1996).
49. See id. at 16-17.
50. See Wu, supra note 43, at 692.
51. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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avoid the legal penalties for employing the disfavored technology is
exactly what is anticipated by the regulator. But the desired inno-
vation only occurs when innovation is cheaper than the penalty for
maintaining the prohibited status quo—in the case of CAFE stan-
dards, for example, a few automobile manufacturers have opted to
pay fines for violating the standards rather than alter the design of
their products.52
Ian Ayres and Amy Kapczynski have considered the incentives
related to some of these examples—specifically, the CAFE fuel ef-
ficiency standards and the incandescent light bulb phaseouts—in
the context of penalties that are imposed for failure to innovate.53
They contrast such regulatory penalties with regulatory reward
systems, such as grants or intellectual property rights, most often
associated with incentives to innovate.54 Ayres and Kapczynski
argue that regulatory “sticks” or penalties may sometimes be as
effective to promote innovation as the more customary regulatory
“carrots” or rewards.55 Admittedly, as they acknowledge, it is often
difficult to tell carrots from sticks; withholding a government benefit
such as a tax credit might be as much a penalty as imposing a
regulatory fine.56
Wu’s framework of least cost avoidance, drawn as it is from crim-
inal jurisprudence, applies fairly directly to avoidance of such sticks
or penalties. Its application is similarly straightforward in cases
where rewards and penalties are hard to distinguish. Gaining a tax
credit for research and development can also be seen as avoiding a
tax penalty for failing to invest in the specified type of research and
development; under either formulation regulated actors will engage
in much the same calculus of compliance, avoidance, evasion, or
avoision no matter how the tax incentive is viewed.57 Additionally,
the least cost avoidance framework extends beyond explicit legal
52. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-921, VEHICLE FUEL ECONOMY:
REFORMING FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS COULD HELP REDUCE OIL CONSUMPTION BY CARS AND
LIGHT TRUCKS, AND OTHER OPTIONS COULD COMPLEMENT THESE STANDARDS 24 (2007).
53. See Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing
Failures to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1781 (2015).
54. See id. at 1794, 1798.
55. See id. at 1799-803.
56. See id. at 1800-01.
57. See id. at 1799, 1801.
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rewards or penalties to assess behavior vis-à-vis any legal con-
straint—to regulatory scenarios in which no defined reward or pen-
alty was contemplated. Thus, restrictive regulation of GMO crops
might be viewed as a “penalty” for investing in such technology, or
as creating a “reward” for switching to mutagenic crops, but seems
best viewed as creating a formal constraint that invites technical
avoision.58
Perhaps surprisingly, a least cost avoidance framework also
functions in the context of regulatory rewards, at least where the
regulatory rewards constitute exclusive rights.59 Limited periods of
market exclusivity in the form of systems of intellectual property
rights are certainly the most readily recognized rewards for
innovation.60 But these carrots come bundled with sticks.61 Unlike
other innovation carrots such as a grant or tax benefit, which can be
simultaneously enjoyed by any innovator who meets the regulatory
criteria, intellectual property rights differentiate among innovat-
ors.62 Intellectual property law offers a reward to only one innovator
who holds the exclusive rights.63 In the case of patents, for example,
the reward generally goes to the first qualifying patent applicant.64
Other, subsequent competitors, even if they are innovating, are
excluded and so are effectively penalized for applying later in time.65
B. Cost Complexities
Determining which of these alternatives will be the cheapest,
preferred choice can be complex. The choice of response to a given
regulation will be determined by the total cost of a particular
alternative,66 and multiple overlapping regulations may impose con-
flicting costs. For example, the avoision of EPA CAFE emissions
58. See infra Part II.
59. See infra Part III.
60. See generally Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of
First Principles, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397 (2012) (reviewing incentive theories of intel-
lectual property).
61. See Ayres & Kapczynski, supra note 53, at 1811.
62. See id. at 1782-83.
63. See Burk, supra note 60, at 399.
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012).
65. See id.
66. See Wu, supra note 43, at 688-89.
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standards for passenger vehicles, mentioned above,67 is complicated
by a set of tax incentives—and disincentives—relating to the pro-
duction and import of light trucks.68
As a class, light trucks and sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) are
exempt from a U.S. federal manufacturing excise tax for “gas guz-
zlers,” entirely apart from their position in the EPA’s fleet emission
standards requirements.69 Accordingly, a design that places a ve-
hicle into this class not only accrues a less burdensome emission
standard, but it also incurs a tax benefit. At the same time, light
trucks are also subject to the so-called “chicken tax,” an import tariff
imposed on imported trucks during the 1960s by the Johnson
Administration in retaliation for French and German import duties
on American chickens.70 Since the Johnson Administration, car
companies have increasingly manufactured many “American” brand
automobiles outside the United States to take advantage of lower
manufacturing and labor costs.71 To enjoy the savings of manufac-
turing abroad while avoiding the onerous “chicken tax” import
duties on light trucks, Ford Motor Company imports one light truck
model as a passenger vehicle, then, after its arrival in the United
States, strips out the rear seats and seatbelts to convert the vehicle
into a light truck.72
Such a scheme only becomes attractive if the private savings from
offshore manufacturing, minus the cost of reconfiguring the vehi-
cles, plus the savings from avoiding the import tariff, generate a
more attractive profit than would domestic manufacture. But, from
a social welfare perspective, this seems to be a highly perverse
67. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
69. See David L. Greene et al., Feebates, Rebates and Gas-Guzzler Taxes: A Study of
Incentives for Increased Fuel Economy, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 757, 758 (2005).
70. Dan Ikenson, Ending the “Chicken War”: The Case for Abolishing the 25 Percent Truck
Tariff 1, 2 (CATO Inst., Trade Briefing Paper No. 17, 2003), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.
org/files/pubs/pdf/tbp-017.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM6A-U69T].
71. See Jenny Strieter, Buying “American” Could Mean Buying Foreign, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Mar. 13, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/cars-trucks/
best-cars-blog/2013/03/Buying_American_Could_Mean_Buying_Foreign/ [https://perma.cc/
8MCC-GB4Q].
72. See Matthew Dolan, To Outfox the Chicken Tax, Ford Strips Its Own Vans, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 23, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125357990638429655 [https://
perma.cc/H7KY-TL2V].
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design work-around, wasting a good deal of time, material, and ef-
fort to convert imports from one classification to another.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL AVOISION
If we are to determine when a regulated entity is likely to choose
avoision rather than noncompliance or lobbying as the least cost
choice, and also determine how to avoid rewarding socially detri-
mental avoision such as Ford’s response to the chicken tax, then we
must also give some consideration to the relative costs of different
types of avoision. For example, we are somewhat accustomed to
exploitation of loopholes in areas such as tax or finance, where deals
may be restructured or ownership reallocated so as to reduce tax lia-
bility or to circumvent other types of regulatory oversight.73 Much
of the activity typical of such avoision might be considered “onto-
logical,” in the sense of reclassifying the activity being regulated.
Such reclassification is likely to be relatively low cost, involving
relabeling an activity rather than the higher costs associated with
redesigning or physically altering a product.74
Of course, to some extent, all avoision involves moving activity
from one classification to another—if only from the category of
regulated to that of unregulated. But purely ontological avoision
simply switches labels and does not prompt the kind of innovative
activity we are concerned with here. Paying a certain debt on
January 1 rather than December 31, so as to advantageously move
the debit into a different tax year, constitutes a pure category shift,
requires minimal implementation costs, and generates no new phys-
ical artifacts. Such exploitation of tax and accounting loopholes
might in some sense be considered quite creative and perhaps even
ingenious. But whatever the merits of such nontechnical innova-
tion, it will seldom if ever produce technological development.75 
73. See Sarah Stodola, 10 Giant Loopholes that Businesses Use to Dodge Taxes, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2011, 1:17 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/corporate-tax-breaks-2011-
2 [https://perma.cc/2XAB-2N44].
74. See id.
75. There is a related, long-standing debate in patent policy regarding whether incentives
are really needed to prompt new forms of business practices. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 263, 263-65 (2000).
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Nonetheless, awareness of purely ontological avoision allows us
to recognize that, even within the subset of technological avoision,
there exists a range of costs and complexity for tangible implemen-
tation. This is clear from the avoision examples discussed above.
Changing the dimensions of the PT Cruiser to shift categories from
“passenger vehicle” to “light truck” seems largely ontological rather
than technical ingenuity.76 If the design change requires additional
or different materials than would be needed for a passenger vehi-
cle, there may be some cost difference in producing the vehicle with
the footprint of a light truck, but the numerical alteration seems
very close to an accounting stratagem. On the other hand, develop-
ing mutagenic seed varieties to avoid the GMO regulatory category
likely involves more than juggling numbers or shifting labels.77
Changing methods of seed development requires the implementa-
tion of new procedures, new expertise, and perhaps even new ap-
paratus.78 This seems a more likely candidate to foster technical
creativity, or at least the possibility of technical creativity.
A. Copyright Avoision
Thus, in some circumstances, avoision may involve creative en-
gineering rather than creative accounting. In particular, where a
regulation specifies certain technological parameters—such as a
certain definition of “genetically modified organism”—loopholes or
unregulated spaces in the statute may be exploited by technical
redesign.79 In his discussion of least cost avoidance, Timothy Wu
explores the motivation for legal loopholes to produce technological
avoision.80 Following the framework set out by Lawrence Lessig’s
analysis of law and technology,81 Wu observes that both formal law
and technological design can be constraints on behavior, and are to
some degree interchangeable for achieving behavioral outcomes.
This equivalence implies that avoision may occur by restructuring
technology rather than by restructuring behavior where technologi-
76. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
79. See Wu, supra note 43, at 708.
80. See id. at 682.
81. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
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cal restructuring is less costly than compliance.82 In other words,
technical innovation may occur in response to regulation when
compliance, disobedience, and lobbying are more expensive.
Wu’s case study for technological avoision is the development of
peer-to-peer file-sharing systems in the wake of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ Napster decision, which held that the purveyors
of the Napster peer-to-peer file-sharing system were contributorily
and vicariously liable for copyright infringement.83 The conclusion
of secondary copyright liability was a direct consequence of the
particular technological design of the Napster system. The individ-
ual computing devices connected in a peer-to-peer system, rather
than communicating through a central hub, communicate directly
with one another. But the Napster system featured a centralized
database listing the files resident on the system; users accessed the
database to determine which files they wished to share or acquire,
then exchanged files directly between their individual machines.
The presence of this centralized indexing feature led the Ninth Cir-
cuit to conclude that Napster had the ability to monitor both who
was using its system and which files were accessible by means of the
system.84 Such knowledge of infringing activity is a key component
of secondary copyright liability, and led inevitably to the finding of
infringement.85
Given that secondary liability was premised on the centralized
features of the Napster system, it is no surprise that such features
were notably absent from the next generation of peer-to-peer file-
sharing software.86 Napster’s successors, such as Grokster and
KaZaa avoided any centralized monitoring or control point in their
peer-to-peer architectures, adopting more fully distributed designs
that dispersed not only content but also indexing among multiple
network nodes.87 Consequently, when the developers of these
systems were sued on the same theory as the Napster lawsuit, they
82. See Wu, supra note 43, at 681-83.
83. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
84. Id. at 1021-24.
85. Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other
Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 949 (2001).
86. REBECCA GIBLIN, CODE WARS: 10 YEARS OF P2P SOFTWARE LITIGATION 29-33 (2011).
87. Id. at 73-74; Lior Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence
of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 517 (2003).
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were able to assert quite truthfully that they had no means of
knowing who or what was on their system at any given time.
Because they had no ability to monitor or control the use of their
systems, they could not be secondarily liable for infringing activity
as Napster had been. This defense was perversely successful; the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged that Grokster lacked
the necessary knowledge and control needed for contributory in-
fringement, and instead invented and imposed a new form of
secondary liability, dubbed inducement, which required no central-
ized features to trigger liability.88
B. Avoiding Public Transmissions
More recently, I have noted that a similar pattern of technical re-
design is seen in the Supreme Court’s recent American Broadcasting
Companies v. Aereo, Inc. decision.89 My analysis of Aereo’s technical
work-around provides a foundation for considering technological
avoision as a general matter: much as Grokster and similar peer-to-
peer services developed new architectures to avoid the legal
definition for secondary liability, the Aereo service developed a new
technical architecture in order to avoid copyright law’s definition of
public performance.90 Among other exclusive rights, the U.S. copy-
right statute grants copyright holders an exclusive right of public
performance for their protected works. Judicial interpretation of
that provision had previously held that the public performance right
does not encompass an individually stored recording of a broadcast
television show, accessed by a particular user at that user’s discre-
tion.91 Rather, such an individually controlled transmission was
held to constitute a private performance outside the ambit of the
copyright holder’s exclusive right.
The Aereo service provided its subscribers with retransmission of
over-the-air broadcast television programming, by means of Internet
streaming.92 Taking advantage of the judicial characterization of
88. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934-37 (2005).
89. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
90. Dan L. Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550-51 (2015).
91. Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008).
92. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
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noninfringing private transmission, Aereo designed a technical
system that incorporated thousands of tiny antennae that received
broadcast programming, and each of which was assigned to an in-
dividual subscriber.93 The antenna signals were either transmitted
directly to its assigned subscriber via Internet streaming media or
stored in an individual recording accessible only to the particular
subscriber.94 Thus, every step of the Aereo transmission service was
designed to permit only private performances, by individualizing the
reception and transmission technology, avoiding—or complying
with—judicial definitions of the rights of the copyright holder as
articulated in previous copyright decisions.
The copyright owners of broadcast programs challenged the legiti-
macy of the Aereo service in an infringement suit that was rejected
by a majority of a Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewing panel.
The majority agreed that Aereo’s system complied with its previous
decisions on public performance, providing only a private transmis-
sion.95 The third panel judge, Judge Chin, remained unconvinced,
asserting in an outraged dissent that the Aereo system design was
an “over-engineered,” “Rube Goldberg” contraption, created solely
to avoid the letter of the copyright statute.96 This conclusion rested
in part on the observation it might well have been more efficient to
design a service for streaming and recording broadcast with a single
receiving antenna, rather than Aereo’s multiple antennae. Absent
the previous judicial definition of public performance, Judge Chin
believed that there was no particular reason to design the system
with tiny individual receiving antennae except to avoid copyright
holders’ exclusive rights. Ultimately, the Supreme Court largely
agreed, rejecting the Aereo system’s “technological differences” as
93. Cecilia Kang & Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Decide on Aereo, an Obscure Start-
Up that Could Reshape the TV Industry, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/business/technology/2014/04/21/50bbd1e8-c59d-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html
[https://perma.cc/W42V-3JCK].
94. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
95. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 693 (2d Cir. 2013).
96. Id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting). Judge Chin’s reference to a “Rube Goldberg” design
invokes the cartoonist famous for illustrating ridiculously complicated and improbable
mechanisms for producing simple results. See MAYNARD FRANK WOLFE, RUBE GOLDBERG
INVENTIONS 8-9 (2000).
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immaterial to the question of public performance, and holding Aereo
liable for infringement.97
C. Private and Social Costs
As with the other examples of avoision described above, the tech-
nical innovation that occurred in the cases of Grokster or Aereo was
certainly not contemplated within the original purposes of the
statute that animated their creation. The copyright statute is in-
tended to promote creative works, not to promote advances in the
structure of the technology that transmits such works.98 Copyright
law is for the most part not associated with technological innova-
tion—most copyrightable subject matter, such as painting, dance,
drama, or poetry, lies within the areas of artistic or aesthetic cre-
ation.99 Computer software is an exception to this rule, but even in
the case of computer software, copyright is expected to cover only
the expressive portions of the code (if any)—not the functional or
technical portions.100
Perverse incentives to technically innovate around the loopholes
in the American copyright statute therefore demonstrate an extreme
variety of avoision, in which the statute promotes a kind of innova-
tion that lies entirely outside its subject matter. Perverse innovation
is by definition never what was contemplated by the law, but, where
copyright is concerned, technical innovation of any sort is not a stat-
utory goal. The oddly dimensioned PT Cruiser may not have been
the outcome envisaged by the CAFE regulations, but the PT Cruiser
is still a vehicle within the statute’s purview.101 Mutated crop
varieties may not have been an outcome anticipated under GMO
crop regulations, but they are still crops.102 By contrast, the Aereo
system is not a copyrighted work at all.103
97. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507.
98. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1151 (2007) (discussing the statutory goal of promoting creativity through copyright
law).
99. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (listing categories of copyright subject matter).
100. See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2323 (1994).
101. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, the Aereo system has an impact on the goals
of the statute that prompted its creation. Technical designs that cir-
cumvent the copyright definition of public performance are not only
unanticipated, but may perversely diminish the scope of exclusivity
conferred by the law on the copyright holder. This suggests two
dimensions or components to the social cost of avoision in the Aereo
case: the social cost of an outcome that is not the law’s expected
outcome, and the social cost of the method by which such avoision
is achieved. Technological avoision in copyright has the potential to
undermine aspects of the system’s existing incentive structure. In
other words, the total cost of perverse innovation in copyright may
depend on whether a given innovation nibbles away at the existing
regulatory carrot.
For purposes of this Article, I dispense with consideration of the
second kind of cost. It is not a generalized problem for perverse in-
novation, as it will occur only in those instances in which there is an
existing regulatory carrot. In the case of copyright, such nibbling
costs are historically endogenous to the balance of interests in
copyright.104 As Jessica Litman has pointed out, as a historical mat-
ter, new communications technologies routinely grow up outside the
purview of the copyright statute.105 Phonographs, photography,
movies, radio, and other technical media were initially held to fall
outside the ambit of copyright even though they incorporated crea-
tive work that might otherwise be subject to copyright.106 None of
them appear to have been developed in response to copyright loop-
holes, but they flourished within such loopholes.107 Only later were
these media brought within statutory copyright.108 Historically, the
copyright system has, via statutory reform, been well able to deal
with the question of exclusivity in innovative media.109
104. These types of costs have been the subject of a number of other copyright-oriented
examinations based on the Aereo decision. See, e.g., Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We
(Still) Need to Talk About Aereo: New Controversies and Unresolved Questions After the
Supreme Court’s Decision, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 109, 109-11 (2015); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Aereo and Copyright’s Private-Public Performance Line, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 205, 205-
06 (2014); Ira Steven Nathenson, Aereo’s Errors, 2 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 171, 197-98 (2014).
105. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 106-07 (2001).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 106.
109. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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The Aereo and Grokster situations are unusual because the
statute prompted the new media through avoision. When we set
aside questions of interference with existing carrots, the general
question then becomes that articulated by Judge Chin in his Aereo
dissent: whether the perverse innovation, directed toward avoiding
its animating regulation, rather than toward expected compliance,
is socially useful or socially detrimental.110 Often it may be the lat-
ter. I have already suggested that it is probably not in the general
social interest to have Ford tear out the seats of what are nominally
imported passenger cars to produce light trucks, or to fill the shelves
of European grocers with mutagenic produce having unknown qual-
ities, even if these are the least costly options for the actors engaged
in such avoision.111 These activities seem not merely to perversely
circumvent statutory intent, but to do so in a perversely costly man-
ner.
But it is not at all clear that the statutory circumvention leading
to the peer-to-peer Grokster architecture or to the Aereo multian-
tenna reception system imposes the same type of costs. These out-
comes seem to lie elsewhere on a continuum of avoision. Redesign
of the PT Cruiser footprint seems very close to ontological avoision
along the lines of tax or accounting loopholes: a superficial, probably
low-cost change in numbers, merely to achieve reclassification.112
The teardown of Ford vehicles seems a rather expensive alteration
merely to achieve reclassification, and involves no new technical
development at all. But the engineering of the Grokster and Aereo
systems, along with perhaps the example of the mutagenic seeds,
generates a more innovative, or at least novel, product with the po-
tential for whatever benefits we value from technical innovation.113
Of course, Judge Chin may be correct that the latter products are
unnecessary or are inefficient over designs that might have been
produced without the avoision motive. But even if orthogonal to the
purposes of the statute that prompted them, such products appear
to be technically innovative, rather than merely ontologically clever.
110. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J.,
dissenting).
111. See supra notes 11-17, 75-76 and accompanying text.
112. See supra Parts II.A-B.
113. See supra Parts II.A-B.
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Thus, whatever the comparative merits of such specific examples,
they suggest that in some cases redesign results not merely in on-
tological avoision, but also in production of a new technology outside
the ambit of the existing legal scheme. Indeed, the CAFE limits
discussed above appear to produce both types of avoision: changes
in the PT Cruiser footprint to achieve reclassification, but perhaps
also some technological efficiencies in fuel combustion, as was
intended by the passage of the statute.114
Returning to Wu’s least cost avoidance framework, we can recog-
nize from these examples that there may at times be a disjunction
between the public and private cost of avoision—the lowest cost
option for a particular actor may not be the lowest cost option for
society generally. Indeed, the choice that minimizes the cost to a
given regulated actor might well be socially wasteful. For perverse
avoision to be guided toward social benefit, public and private
valuations should align. If socially beneficial innovative avoision
sometimes occurs, the question is whether it is possible to identify
and optimize such avoision so as to minimize the socially wasteful
variety. One potential method for separating wasteful and benefi-
cial avoision may come from the treatment of parallel types of inno-
vation in the area of patent law.
III. LESSONS FROM PATENT LAW
Technologically innovative avoision appears largely independent
of the innovation purposes of the technological regulation that
prompts it. We have seen that such avoision appears in the
examples of European GMO policy, which was not intended to foster
technical innovation, and American copyright law, which is primar-
ily intended to foster expressive creativity. It also appears in the
example of U.S. EPA fuel efficiency policy, which was intended to
foster technical innovation by means of regulatory penalties. But
perhaps surprisingly, directed technological perversity is a familiar
feature of the law most often associated with innovation incentives,
which is the law relating to patents.
114. See David L. Greene, Why CAFE Worked, 26 ENERGY POL’Y 595, 610 (1998).
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Patent law has long entailed an expectation that competitors to
a patent holder will “invent around” the claims of the patent. The
scope of a patent holder’s rights are defined in the patent document
by textual claims that recite the features of technology intended to
be covered by the patent. The exclusive rights conferred by the pat-
ent include any unauthorized making, using, selling, offering for
sale, or importing technology that falls within the claims.115
Competitors engaging in these activities may be liable as infringers.
One way to avoid infringement liability is to invest in developing
substitute technologies that do not have the precise features recited
in the claims. Development of such substitutes in effect “invents
around” the obstacle posed by the text of the patent claims.116
This activity is of course a form of technological avoision, intended
to deliberately circumvent the patent claims, just as the other
examples we have seen are intended to deliberately circumvent
statutory texts. Such inventing around in patent law is, like techno-
logical avoision generally, and indeed like any textual loophole that
takes advantage of the incompleteness of the text, driven by textual
formalism. Because patent rights are defined by written claims,
determining the scope of the claims requires interpretation.117
Current interpretive practice almost invites avoision. In an earlier
era, patent disclosures were interpreted purposively, according to
what the inventor accomplished and intended, and what courts
deemed a fair scope of protection for the inventor’s efforts.118 But as
patent claims have come to represent the outermost definitive limits
of patent holder’s rights, this approach of “central claiming” has
been replaced by “peripheral claiming” which purports to give a
strict meaning to the text.119
Thus, under current interpretive rubrics, the first step in patent
claim construction is deciding the literal meaning of the claims—
115. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
116. See Paul N. Katz & Robert R. Riddle, Designing Around a United States Patent, 45 S.
TEX. L. REV. 647, 649 (2004).
117. See Dan L. Burk, Dynamic Claim Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW 107 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (discussing formalism in claim
interpretation).
118. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2009).
119. See generally id.
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that is, to assign discrete denotations to words or phrases within the
text.120 Such peripheral claim construction is intended to be both
technologically inclusive and exclusive. Literal claim construction
purports to define a conceptual boundary that designates not only
what technology is covered by the patent, but also what technology
is not covered by the patent. Technologies that lack each and every
element found in the text of the claims, or that arrange the elements
of the claims in some substantially different way, fall outside the
formal denotation of the text. Technologies outside the textual pe-
riphery are not considered infringing.
Competitors to the patent holder are considered perfectly justi-
fied in developing or adopting noninfringing alternatives that lie
outside the interpretive boundaries of the claims. A technological
design that intentionally skirts the patent holder’s rights may be
viewed as a proper or desirable response to the competitive obstacle
posed by patent exclusivity. Patents are considered something of a
necessary evil, providing an exclusive reward for innovative activity,
but at the same time potentially burdening access to the patented
technology. Consequently, patent owners are considered to be en-
titled to the full scope of their exclusive rights, but no more than
that.
Indeed, far from frustrating or eluding the intent of the patent,
inventing around may be viewed as furthering important goals of
the patent system. Such activity has been particularly touted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as a spur to
innovation. The court has repeatedly suggested that rights which
may be viewed as impediments to competitors actually force compet-
itors to become more innovative in the course of avoiding infringe-
ment.121 This inventing around rationale suggests that patents not
only constitute a direct reward for innovation, but also somewhat
perversely spur innovation by an alternative, adjunct effect, as
others seek permissible alternatives to the legally encumbered
technology. On this view, patents promote innovation not only via
120. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 395-96 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (explain-
ing claim interpretation).
121. See, e.g., Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Kimberly-Clark
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1457-58 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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the carrot of exclusive rights in a meritorious invention but also via
the stick of infringement liability for those who stray into the pro-
tected area of the claims.
A. The Cost of Inventing Around
If this view of inventing around is correct, then assessing the
benefits of such secondary innovation effects is complex, but helpful
to understanding technological avoision generally. In particular,
several key economic features of patent law’s inventing around
doctrine have been explored in the context of literature on patent
racing and rent dissipation.122 The phenomenon known as patent
racing occurs in situations where two (or more) competitors invest
resources into developing an invention, each seeking to be first to
secure a patent. Patent racing may be wasteful if the competition to
secure the patent leads to “rent dissipation,” that is, to over-invest-
ment in invention development that offsets the future income from
the exclusive rights attending the patent.123 However, Mark Lemley
has recently argued to the contrary that racing may be socially
beneficial because patent races may develop alternatives to the
patented technology. The availability of alternatives encourages
competition, avoiding the potential monopoly stagnation of placing
a broad swath of exclusive rights into the hands of a single patent
owner.124
Nonetheless, the orthodox view of such races has been that both
the private and social value of the patent might be overshadowed
by expenditures to capture legal exclusivity.125 This analysis gives
some insight into the social value of inventing around. Inventing
around may be regarded as a sort of patent race in which one of the
parties has already won. In patent races, two innovators seek to be
122. See Michael B. Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 119
(2003).
123. See id. at 185-86.
124. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 753 (2012);
see also Robert P. Merges, Commentary, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on
the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359 (1992) (cautioning that preventing rent dis-
sipation could curb beneficial competition).
125. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
REV. 305, 309-10 (1992); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1869 (1984).
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the first to claim a patent; in inventing around, the late coming
competitor is left to develop a technological alternative to the patent
that has already been granted.126 In terms used by Ayres and
Kapczynski, the follow-on innovator is no longer seeking to claim
the carrot, which has already been claimed, but rather to avoid the
costs of the licensing (or infringement) stick.127
Thus, as in patent racing, wasteful inventing around might occur
when a competitor over-invests in avoiding the patent claims cover-
ing the existing technology. The follow-on competitor may perhaps
not be re-inventing the wheel, but is at least re-inventing an
unclaimed variation on the wheel. If the unpatented variation
essentially duplicates the functions of the patented version without
providing a significant advance in the art, then avoiding the license
may not advance social welfare. In such cases there may be private
value in avoiding a license to the claimed invention, but little public
value from the investment necessary to do so. 
However, as highlighted by Lemley’s characterization of patent
racing, simply having an alternative may itself be valuable, as
substitutes help to deter detrimental monopolies.128 Substitutes, of
course, accomplish this by undercutting the market power of the
patent holder, and so diminish the returns the patent holder can
expect from her investment in innovation. The degree to which this
will be true will depend on the degree to which the follow-on alter-
native is a true substitute, and the calculus of social welfare will be
the usual guesstimate balancing innovation incentives and impedi-
ments to competition. However, if the Federal Circuit is to be
believed, there are at least some instances in which the technologi-
cal alternative will be an advance on the prior technology, so that
the benefits of innovation and of competition both weigh in favor of
inventing around. In such cases private loss to the patent holder
fuels overall social welfare.
Some additional insight into the relative costs and benefits of
inventing around can also be drawn from previous analyses of the
related area of trade secrecy. Patent law is not unique in encourag-
ing inventing around; the law of trade secrets, which penalizes
126. See Abramowicz, supra note 122, at 190.
127. Ayres & Kapczynski, supra note 53, at 1788 & n.29.
128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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misappropriation of confidential business information, is structured
in such a way as to encourage similar productive circumvention of
the proprietary right. Either reverse engineering or independent re-
creation of proprietary information are considered permissible
methods to obtain a trade secret.129 The availability of these permis-
sible options channels effort into inventive activity rather than into
socially wasteful activity, such as industrial espionage.130 So long as
reverse engineering or independent re-creation of a trade secret is
a lower cost alternative to the likely penalty for misappropriation,
they will be the preferred option. Although such are duplicative of
the knowledge held by the trade secret owner, they tend to be
socially preferable to industrial espionage, as they encourage invest-
ment in human and firm expertise.
This least cost avoidance view of trade secrecy extends to the
additional option of licensing the secret. The existence of permissi-
ble modes of obtaining otherwise confidential information places a
natural cap on the cost of licensing a trade secret.131 A trade secret
holder cannot promise a licensee exclusivity, as the proprietary
right offers no claims against reverse engineering or independent
development. Trade secret licenses are therefore always bargains
for disclosure, since the licensee could without a license opt to
reverse engineer or independently create the secret himself. And,
since these approaches are available as alternatives to disclosure,
the cost of disclosure will rationally be set at something a bit less
than the cost of the alternatives.132 If the trade secret holder sets the
price higher, the potential licensee will opt for the cheaper permissi-
ble alternatives.
This view of trade secrecy suggests a similar approach to under-
standing patent inventing around. Much as in trade secrecy, patent
inventing around is unlikely to occur unless the patent holder and
the competitor have very different estimations of the cost of devel-
129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
130. See David Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
61, 70 (1991).
131. See Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of
Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 984 (1977).
132. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 279 (1977).
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oping an alternative technology.133 If the valuations of inventing
around are similar, the parties are likely to be able to negotiate a
royalty for use of the patented technology that will be lower than
the cost of inventing around. Both parties have incentives to reach
such an agreement; the competitor will not wish to incur the invent-
ing around cost if the royalty is cheaper, and the patent holder will
be inclined to set the royalty low enough to avoid inducing the
competitor to invent around. If the patent holder gets greedy,
raising the price of a license or otherwise holding out, he may then
have to deal with an invented around substitute that will undercut
his exclusivity. Consequently, inventing around, when it occurs, in
some sense represents a bargaining breakdown.
As both the economics of patent racing and those of trade secrecy
suggest, the positive view of inventing around that I have outlined
above entails a tricky allocation of economic surplus between the
patent holder and the competitor.134 The initial innovator who ob-
tains the patent must be awarded sufficient surplus from the social
value to motivate optimal investment in the patented item; this may
include some of the value of follow-on innovation. At the same time,
the follow-on competitor must be allocated enough surplus to ensure
the necessary investment in beneficial inventing around, and
private licensing may not accomplish this allocation properly. This
suggests some risk that incentives for patent inventing around will
be deficient. Just as inventing around may be socially wasteful if the
private value to the competitor exceeds the social benefit of having
a new alternative technology, so too failure to invent around may be
socially wasteful where the private value of the license to the patent
owner exceeds the social benefit of having the new technology.
B. Controlling Avoision Incentives
This analysis of patent inventing around provides a useful per-
spective on technically innovative avoision. Some distinctions must
be taken into account. Perverse innovation should not be expected
133. See Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market Structure, and Innovation:
Chakrabarty, Rohm and Haas, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 464 (1982).
134. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research
and Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 34-35 (1991).
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to produce racing, at least not in the same sense that this occurs in
patent inventing around. Avoision is not a race between competing
private parties. The provisions of a public statute, rather than the
claims of a private right, are the text around which perverse inno-
vation will occur. If patent inventing around constitutes a race in
which one of the parties has already reached the finish line, per-
verse innovation is perhaps a race in which the regulator has
already won. The benchmark against which technical redesign may
occur is not the scope of rights held by a competitor, but the default
set by the regulation—perhaps the regulatory default is no incan-
descent light bulb production, or heavily impeded deployment of
GMO crops. Thus, avoision does not occur from bargaining break-
down—the regulator is not in the market to license compliance, at
least not ostensibly—but the threshold incentive structure is the
same.
A sort of avoision “racing” may of course also occur between
competing regulated entities; there will be multiple private parties
constrained by the copyright statute, or by the CAFE requirements,
or by GMO regulations. Each of them may independently seek to
avoid the legal constraint via technical redesign. But in general
such redesign is neither rivalrous nor exclusive. One party’s design-
around does not prevent another party’s design-around; indeed, they
may be duplicative or similar. The outcome of successful technical
avoision is not the allocation of exclusive rights, and so the invest-
ment in avoision is not driven by the promise of exclusivity. Rather,
the private reward for such innovation is the difference in cost
between the innovative design and the cost of compliance, and this
can accrue to multiple competitors.
C. Avoision Equivalents
In the patent context, the allocation of surplus, and the problem
of social waste, is in part addressed by ensuring that a competitor’s
circumvention of patent claims is not a trivial variation on the
claimed invention, but must be significantly different from what is
delineated in the claims. This is required by patent law’s Doctrine
of Equivalents (DOE), which prevents such trivial or obvious invent-
ing around patent claims. Courts long ago realized that an overly
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formalist reading of patent claims would render them essentially
worthless, as potential infringers would find loopholes in the
claims and make trivial changes that would fall outside a strict
reading of the text, but which would effectively provide a market
substitute for the claimed invention.135 The DOE therefore devel-
oped to provide an additional zone of protection where the strict
language of the claims might not.136 The DOE therefore harks back
to the era of central claiming, allowing a more purposive reading of
the claims than strict peripheral claiming would provide.137
Under the DOE, a substitution that performs the same function
in the same way with the same result as a patented item, even if not
formally within the text of the claims, still infringes by equivalents,
if not literally.138 Thus, in order to avoid infringement, a competitor
who is inventing around a patent will need to avoid known substitu-
tions in order to avoid infringing the patent by equivalents.139 The
competitor must not merely invent around, but invent around by a
substantial margin. Consequently, successful inventing around re-
quires venturing at least somewhat into the unknown. Indeed, while
a noninfringing substitution need not necessarily qualify for its own
patent, the ambit of equivalents is demarcated by the patent inven-
tiveness criterion of obviousness.140 Successful circumvention of
patent claims will therefore tend to require a substantial degree of
innovation, and the investment that goes along with this require-
ment. Inventing around will occur only in the cost range where it is
less expensive than taking a license, and also less expensive than
developing a substantially different substitute. 
Equivalence thus helps to separate desirable inventing around
from wasteful inventing around. I have suggested in earlier work
135. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342-43 (1853).
136. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
137. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 118, at 1772.
138. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
139. See Paul N. Katz, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Its Impact on “Designing Around,”
4 FED. CIR. B.J. 315, 323 (1994).
140. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684-85 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (holding that the permissible scope of equivalents cannot include embodiments that
would have been obvious at the time of patenting); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002) (holding, in language similar to that defining
nonobviousness, that prosecution history estoppel is based on the foreseeability of an
equivalent to those of skill in the art).
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that an equivalence standard might benefit technical innovation
associated with copyright.141 Certainly the Supreme Court in Aereo
engaged in a type of purposive statutory reading, deeming Aereo’s
system to fall within the Congressional intent for cable systems,
whatever the actual characteristics of the technology. This consti-
tutes a type of equivalents standard, declaring the system to be
essentially a substitute for a conventional cable transmission sys-
tem as contemplated by the copyright statute.142 The Court un-
fortunately did so without the benefit of the DOE’s multipart
functional analysis, or for that matter any cost-benefit balancing.
The analysis focused only on the result of the Aereo service, not on
its actual function or method of operation.143 The outcome was
therefore consistent with a theory of rewarding copyrightable crea-
tion, but without any serious consideration of the impact on non-
copyright innovation or the impact on overall social welfare that
might occur.
Evaluation on a patent DOE model might more comprehensively
ask whether the Aereo antenna design accomplished the same re-
sult as a cable system, in the same manner as a cable system, by
means of the same function as a cable system.144 It seems fairly
clear that the answer to at least two of these questions would be no:
Aereo produced a result equivalent to that of a cable rebroadcast
system, but clearly did so in a different way, employing different
technological functions. This suggests that the Aereo redesign was
substantial enough to constitute productive inventing around. An
alternative version of the patent equivalents test would ask whether
the antenna array was a known substitute for previous antenna
apparatus.145 Answering this inquiry might require some investiga-
tion into the engineering literature, but again I suspect the answer
would be no, meaning that the change was substantial.
141. See Burk, supra note 90, at 558-59.
142. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2507 (2014). Ironically, having been
declared a cable equivalent, Aereo was unable to secure treatment as a cable system for other
purposes such as statutory licensing. See Annemarie Bridy, Aereo: From Working Around
Copyright to Thinking Inside the (Cable) Box, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 465, 473.
143. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507.
144. See Katz, supra note 139, at 324.
145. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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Adoption of a similar approach in other regulation would simi-
larly help ensure that technological avoision in other regulatory are-
nas is socially productive. Language is imprecise and no regulator
can anticipate all the loopholes. But unanticipated circumventions
can be channeled in productive directions by adopting the rule that
technical exploitation of a textual loophole should only be considered
compliant with the underlying law if it is a nontrivial advance over
what was contemplated. Returning to our previous examples, unless
shifting the “footprint” measurement of an automobile involves real
engineering challenges, the PT Cruiser seems a known or obvious
substitution. On the other hand, mutagenesis methods may not
necessarily be a known substitute for GMOs; the function and
method of producing mutagenic plants appear different from the
target of the GMO regulation, even if the result is similar to a GMO. 
Applying an equivalents standard would raise the private cost of
avoision, directing investment in statutory circumvention toward
socially significant work-arounds. Avoision is always formally com-
pliant with regulation, just as substituting an equivalent is always
literally outside the language of a patent claim. The question in
each case is whether the text should be read more broadly than its
plain meaning, to encompass formally compliant activity that might
nonetheless evade the regulatory purpose. In patent law, the DOE
demarcates the limits of such broader readings, rewarding substan-
tial inventing around by exempting it from the patent.146 A parallel
rule for avoision would draw a line encouraging productive avoision,
sanctioning its formal compliance, and rewarding technical ingen-
uity by exempting it from the animating regulation.
CONCLUSION
Perverse innovation is serendipitous, arising from technical in-
genuity that is directed toward circumventing the formal terms of
regulation. Although many regulations seek to prompt innovation,
perverse innovation may flower where innovation was not the goal.
Innovation in such instances constitutes something of a byproduct,
a possibly useful result of regulation; just as water management
146. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
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may also facilitate the yield of hydroelectric power, regulatory avoi-
sion may yield technical innovation. We know technical redesign
will occur in some instances, and it may be better to channel such
innovation in a useful direction than to have it run wild.
As I have shown here, harnessing the tendency to perverse inno-
vation would require some forethought to balance the incentives
toward the desired alternative. Innovating must be the least costly
alternative, with literal compliance, lobbying, and noncompliance
following in increasing cost order. A primary consideration in mak-
ing innovation the least costly alternative requires the regulator to
produce a relatively “clean” innovation loophole—that is, unlike the
CAFE fuel efficiency classifications, one that is not complicated by
an extended calculus of extraneous tax and regulatory duties. This
requirement may not be simple, but it is of course not at all unique
to scenarios of innovative avoision: more familiar legal schemes that
are clearly intended to offer innovation incentives—for example, the
patent system—are routinely complicated by tax credits, orphan
drug incentives, and a host of other interlocking factors.147 And,
even when innovating is the least costly private alternative, there
remains the concern that the innovation may be the wrong type of
innovation, that is, an avoision that is socially wasteful. A key con-
sideration toward ensuring that the avoision is in fact innovative is
adopting some enforcement rule similar to the patent Doctrine of
Equivalents. Trivial or obvious substitutions for literal compliance
must be considered noncompliant, so that permissible avoision is
substantially different than the core regulated activity. Only when
avoision rises to the level of innovation does perverse innovation
lose its perversity and become socially constructive.
147. See Alexander Korniakov et al., The Orphan Drug and Research Tax Credits: The
“Substantially All” Rule, TAX ADVISER (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/
2014/oct/korniakov-oct14.html [https://perma.cc/8S24-8FDD].
